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THE RCEP, NEW ASIAN REGIONALISM AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
Pasha L. Hsieh 
Abstract: This article provides an up-to-date examination of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is poised to become the world’s largest free trade 
agreement (FTA).  It argues that the 16-country mega-FTA will galvanize the paradigm shift 
in Asian regionalism and build a normative foundation for the Global South in international 
economic law.  Based on intertwined theoretical and substantive claims, this article opens an 
inquiry into the assertive legalism of developing nations in the new regional economic order.   
By analyzing the converging policies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), China and India, the article first demonstrates the status of the RCEP in Asian 
powers’ contemporary FTA practice.  In light of the ASEAN Economic Community and the 
now-eleven member Trans-Pacific Partnership, caution should be given to the utilization of 
tariff preferences, services liberalization and investor-state dispute settlement.  Finally, the 
article assesses the RCEP’s systemic impact on the legal fragmentation due to jurisdictional 
conflicts under trade and investment agreements.  The consolidation of divergent trade rules 
and the pro-development operative mechanism will fortify the RCEP as a pathway to the 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and reinvigorate the multilateral trading system. 
  
                                                 
 Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University School of Law.  E-mail: pashahsieh@smu.edu.sg. 
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International economic law and the Global South are at a crossroads in the era of populist isolationism.1  
The resurgence of Westphalian sovereignty in economic policy has endangered the neoliberal basis of free 
trade that has underpinned the world’s development since the inception of the postwar Bretton Woods 
system.2  Evolving mega-regionals were once perceived to remedy the long-standing impasse of the Doha 
Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Nevertheless, the globalization backlash, evidenced by 
Brexit and the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has 
invigorated developing countries to pursue a new normative foundation for economic integration.3 
Trade nationalism across the Atlantic has not deterred the dynamic development of Asian regionalism, 
which is witnessing a nearly four-fold growth of free trade agreements (FTAs) that represent half of global 
trade pacts.4  A salient feature of the Asian FTAs is the transformation of conventional South-South 
geopolitical cooperation into new-generation economic instruments.  As the most ambitious mega-regional 
agreement led by the Global South, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is poised 
to be the world’s largest FTA in 2018.5   
                                                 
1 See Arif Dirlik, Global South: Predicament and Promise, 1:1 GLOBAL SOUTH 12, 12-15 (2007) (analyzing the notion of the 
Third World and the South); Deniz Altınbaş, South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement? in THE RISE OF 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 29, 29 fn 1 
(Justin Dargin ed. 2013) (clarifying the North-South divide in global politics). 
2 For the nexus between sovereignty and emerging trade protectionism, see Wallace S. Cheng, To Open up Global Trade 
We Need to Understand “Protectionism,” June 13, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/global-trade-
protectionism-g20-explained/; Douglas A. Irwin, The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade Policy Could Backfire, 
96:3 FOREIGN AFF. 45, 45-53 (2017). 
3 The impact of Brexit and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on Asian states, see Hoang 
Thi Ha et. al., ASEAN’s Reflections from Brexit, 9 ASEAN FOCUS 19, 20-21 (2016); Marina Tsirbas et. al., The Future of 
the TPP, 11 ASEAN FOCUS 8, 10-15 (2016).   
4 The number of Asian free trade agreements (FTAs) in effect increased from 39 to 147 from 2000 to 2017.  Table 1. 
FTAs by Status (cumulative), https://aric.adb.org/fta (last visited June 28, 2017); see also Regional Trade Agreements, 
https://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited June 28, 2017) (“As of 5 May 2017, 274 
RTAs were in force.”). 
5 Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (2017), 
at 1; Giovanni Di Lieto, Understanding RCEP in Xi Jinping’s World Trade Game, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 27, 2017., 
http://www.atimes.com/understanding-rcep-xi-jinpings-world-trade-game/; Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, RCEP More 
Relevant Now Than Ever, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 18, 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/rcep-more-relevant-
now-than-ever. 




Built upon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTAs, the 16 RCEP countries 
account for 32% of world goods exports and 28% of global gross domestic product (GDP).6  Incorporating 
the world’s ten most vigorous economies, including ASEAN states, China and India, contributes to the 
bloc’s GDP growth rate of 4.6%, which is more than double that of the United States or the European 
Union.7  More fundamentally, the RCEP agenda will converge fragmented trade rules and the economic 
priorities of Asia’s powerhouses, such as the ASEAN centrality, Beijing’s “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) 
initiative and New Delhi’s Act East Policy.8   
Double the economic scale of the “reborn” TPP, the 11-party Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the RCEP will be the most critical milestone since the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989.9   To a large extent, premature 
aspirations for the TPP have overshadowed academic and policy discourse on the RCEP.  To fill a gap in 
legal literature, this article offers a timely and “on the ground” response to the systemic implications of the 
RCEP for international economic law.  By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, the article 
opens an inquiry into the assertive legalism of developing countries in the new regional economic order 
(NREO) based on new-generation South-South FTAs.10   
                                                 
6 External free trade agreements (FTAs) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were concluded 
between ten ASEAN states collectively with China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and Hong Kong.  
Sanchita Basu Das et. al., Can ASEAN+1 FTAs Be a Pathway towards Negotiating and Designing the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement? 50:2 J. WORLD TRADE 253, 254-60 (2016); Yoshifumi Fukunaga & Ikumo 
Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 4-6; 
ASEAN Connections (2016), at 13.  As a comparison, 11 TPP members and the United States encompass 26% of 
world goods exports and 32% of global gross domestic product (GDP).  ASEAN Connections (2016), at 12. 
7 The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050? (2017), at 7; ERIA East Asia Updates, 
Special 2017 Annual Edition (2017), at 1; ASEAN Connections (2016), at 12-13. 
8 See Zhao Hong, China One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate, 6 Trends in Southeast Asia 1, 1-30 
(investigating current economic policies of ASEAN, China and India). 
9 Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement (2017) [TPP Statement], at 1; see Minister Champagne Welcomes 
Progress on the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Nov. 10, 2017, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-
affairs/news/2017/11/minister_champagnewelcomesprogressonthecomprehensiveandprogressi.html (“The 
members of the CPTPP represent 494 million people, with . . . 13.6% of global GDP”); APEC Outcomes & Outlook 
(2016-2017) [APEC 2016-17], at 48-51 (explaining the milestones of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
since 1989). 
10 Although the term, new regional economic order (NREO), was previously used by commentators, none of them 
have substantiated the theoretical or substantive claims related to mega-regionals and Asian regionalism.  E.g., Adriano 
R. Garcia, Toward a New Regional Economic Order in Asian and the Pacific, X:1-b J. PHIL. DEV. 45, 45-53 (1983); Greg Fry, 
“Pooled Regional Governance” in the Island Pacific: Lessons from History, in PACIFIC ISLANDS REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND 
GOVERNANCE 89, 92 (Satish Chand ed. 2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL INSTITUTION-
BUILDING IN THE NEW ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013).  I will make a further distinction between the 
NREO and the new international economic order (NIEO) in the 1970s in subsequent sections. 




This article argues that the emerging RCEP represents the NREO, which will prompt paradigm shifts 
in Asian regionalism and construct a normative foundation for the Global South in international economic 
law.  It further contends that revolutionizing the RCEP as Asia’s economic framework mandates 
commitments beyond ASEAN+1 FTAs and the new ASEAN Economic Community (AEC).  The 
roadmap, which takes into account of the nexus between the AEC Blueprint 2025 and Asia-Pacific trade 
pacts, will necessitate the realization of the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and reenergize the 
Doha round talks.11 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides the geopolitical context of Asian regionalism by 
deciphering the progress and impediments of mega-regionals and South-based agreements in Third 
Regionalism.12  To buttress the NREO argument, the analysis offers insight into the RCEP’s development, 
negotiating structure and constitutional issues that commentators overlook.  By deciphering the legal 
strategies of ASEAN, China and India, it explains the Global South’s contemporary practice of international 
economic law.  Part III substantiates the RCEP’s paradigm shifts in Asian regionalism.  Based on the 
implementation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC, it challenges the loopholes of tariff eliminations and the 
rules of origin (ROOs) that result in the “noodle bowl syndrome.”13  Given the recent progress of the TPP 
and EU FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, it also examines the implications of professional mobility and 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions. 
Part IV details the RCEP’s systemic impact on regional and multilateral trading systems.  In particular, 
it sheds light on the transformation of normative conflicts amid trade fragmentation.  The overlapping 
jurisdiction between intra-RCEP FTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) requires in-depth scrutiny of 
WTO jurisprudence and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).  Moreover, the RCEP as 
the pathway to the APEC-based FTAAP and the pro-development operative mechanism will be critically 
                                                 
11 APEC Outcomes & Outlook, supra note 9, at 5 & 48. 
12 Built on Jagdish Bhagwati’s explanation of the first two waves of regionalism beginning in the 1960s and 1980s, I 
coined the term, Third Regionalism, which refers to the new trends of FTAs in the Doha Round.  Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 WORD ECO. 535, 538-42 (1992). 
13 See generally Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, ADB Working Paper 
Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 7 (2007). 




analyzed.  Finally, the conclusion draws together theoretical and substantive arguments and offers legal and 
policy advice for Asia-Pacific governments and practitioners. 
II. The RCEP in the New Regional Economic Order 
The RCEP’s impact on Asian regionalism has been arguably intertwined with the China-US rivalry or 
the North-South divide.  Yet, the existing research that discusses the TPP as the “gold standard” FTA for 
the 21st century, either explicitly or implicitly, has dismissed the RCEP as a low-ambition, unpromising 
South-driven pact.14  This position cannot hold true.  The populist backlash in America prompted other 
TPP members to conclude the CPTPP on a much smaller scale and substantiated the significance of the 
RCEP in global regionalism.15  It is thus vital to understand the RCEP’s evolution vis-à-vis the legal and 
policy priorities of stake-holding countries in the emerging NREO. 
A. Asian Regionalism in Theoretical and Geopolitical Contexts 
The RCEP cannot be interpreted in clinical isolation from the geopolitical volatility of Asian regionalism 
and the Asian approach to international economic law.  As a mega-regional alliance, the RCEP is 
representative of the NREO in Third Regionalism.  The new trend is distinct from the movement that 
culminated in the 1974 United Nations General Assembly declaration, which called for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO).16  In rationalizing global regionalism, Jagdish Bhagwati propounded the term 
“First Regionalism” in reference to the failure of FTAs in the 1960s owing to overriding political 
interferences.17  He further asserted that in “Second Regionalism,” robust economic motivations prompted 
                                                 
14 E.g., Michael Wesley, Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia, 69:5 AUS. J. INT’L AFF. 479, 489-90 (2015); Deborah 
Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Looking Ahead to the Next Steps, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 447 
(2013), at 8-9; Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward Deeper Asian Economic 
Integration, 8:2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 359, 368-69 (2013). 
15 E.g., Iman Pambagyo, RCEP is the Only Game in Town, 14 ASEAN FOCUS 26, 26-27 (2017).  The TPP’s ratification 
problems and the stalled negotiations of US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) made the 
RCEP a “promising” mega-regional agreement.  
16 Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), A/RES/S-6/3201, 
May 1, 1974. 
17 Bhagwati, supra note 12, at 538-39.   




the success of the European single market and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
the 1980s and 90s.18 
Following the demise of the NIEO, I propose the NREO as the normative framework to understand 
the contemporary dynamics of FTAs.  Built on Bhagwati’s account, what I call “Third Regionalism” has 
surfaced in the Doha Round and fertilized the NREO since the 2000s.  This new wave highlights a different 
nature of Asian regionalism that bolsters the assertive legalism of the Global South.  The “new dependency 
theory” that rectifies the classical dependency theory provides the theoretical basis for the NREO in Third 
Regionalism in which the RCEP has been developed.  The dependency school that influenced the NIEO 
presupposes the underdevelopment of developing countries as the result of the North-South neocolonial 
relationship.19  As theorists contended, entrenched external unfairness has subordinated the development 
of developing countries to the self-interests of the developed nations.20  By accelerating the North-bound 
trade surplus from the South, international economic relations have only worsened the dependency and 
imparity.21 
The classical dependency theory posits that the solution for the Global South is to cut trade ties with 
the North. 22   Nonetheless, the isolationist stance contravened the economic trajectory of developing 
countries, particularly those that propelled contemporary Asian regionalism.  Addressing the theoretical 
weakness, the new dependency theory argued for the possible coexistence of dependency and 
development. 23   The nature of dependency is dynamic because developing nations could transform 
dependent capitalism into the export-driven economies.24  Rather than becoming preoccupied with the 
                                                 
18 Id. at 540-42; for different phases of Asian regionalism, see Amita Acharya, Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: 
Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 344 (2012), at 5-16; Baldwin, supra note 13, 
at 7-17. 
19 Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60:2 AM. ECO. REV. 231, 232-34 (1970); FERNANDO HENRIQUE 
CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16-17 (Marjory Mattingly 
Urquidi trans.1979); GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-DRIVEN 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (2007). 
20 ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND WORLD-SYSTEM 
THEORIES 95-102 (1990). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 104-05. 
23 See generally SO, supra note 20, at 164-65; FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 
(1999); THOMAS BARON GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE (1986). 
24 Based on Taiwan’s development model, Gold explained how the country transformed its dependent relations with 
Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal export-oriented country.  GOLD, supra note 23, at 21-90; SO, supra 
note 20, at 157-64. 




unequal external relationships, the new theory emphasizes the impact of the South’s internal structures on 
changing neocolonial ties with the North.25 
As the experiences of East Asian and ASEAN states reinforce, dependency is dynamic by nature 
because the South could escape from dependent capitalism and pursue export-driven growth.  New-
generation South-South FTAs that streamline the supply chain further augment the cost-effectiveness and 
the collective power of developing nations to change the structure with the North that was once perceived 
as unfair.  Consequently, the corollaries of the new dependency theory underline the theoretical responses 
to the South-initiated NREO. 
Asian regionalism, which gave rise to the RCEP in the emerging NREO, can trace its roots back to the 
1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where anticolonial nationalism of Asian-African states escalated to 
the Non-Aligned Movement.26  Peripheral to political solidarity, the economic perception of South-South 
cooperation was to parochially enforce the nationalistic concept of self-help by minimizing reliance on the 
West.27  In the 1970s, Non-Aligned Movement states joined the Group of 77 in pushing for NIEO 
principles that demanded absolute sovereignty and affirmative action in international economic law.28  Their 
efforts through the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shaped the rules of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which the United States and Europe had dominated. 
The UNCTAD pushed for including core special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions under the 
GATT, such as the non-reciprocity exception to the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle and the 1979 
Enabling Clause that provides preferential market access for the South.29  However, the NIEO movement 
quickly faded because of the Thatcher-Reagan coalition’s refusal to additional demands and non-uniform 
                                                 
25 Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations: Realism, Dependence or Interdependence, 23:1 
GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 104 (2011); SO, supra note 20, at 137-42. 
26 Acharya, supra note 18, at 5-7. 
27 Id. 
28 The Early Days of the Group of 77, May 2014, https://unchronicle.un.org/article/early-days-group-77; History and 
Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, Aug. 22, 2-12, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement. 
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994), art. XXXVI:8; Differential and More Favorable Treatment 
of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979.  The contracting 
parties of the GATT adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971 decision that granted a ten-year waiver 
allowing generalized system of preferences to depart from GATT norms.  Generalized System of Preferences, Decision 
of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971. 




interests within the Global South.30  The rising Washington Consensus became the dominant driving force 
for creating the WTO and compelled developing nations to engage in North-defined “free trade.”31  Since 
its inception, the WTO has been criticized for ignoring the development needs of the South. 
The NREO is a reaction to the South’s frustrations over the existing global economic order.  Two 
paramount factors in Third Regionalism galvanized the convergence of the Global South’s policies in 
creating the RCEP.  First, the deviation from the US-centric “unipolar moment” to multipolar trade 
governance became a reality in the Doha Round. 32   Asia’s ascending economies have weakened 
Washington’s hegemonic power and materialized multipolar reality.  In 2016. the Obama government’s 
“pivot to Asia” strategy culminated in the inking of the TPP, which was seen as an initiative to tackle rising 
China.33  However, soaring populist isolationism in the United States has undermined the TPP’s strategic 
goals and the cross-Atlantic alliance on which the NIEO once relied.  The stalled Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and the EU agreements with ASEAN states have also 
aggravated the Western powers’ divergent paths.34 
Second, South-South FTAs concluded between developing countries have departed from the NIEO’s 
ideological bedrock of the North-South conflicts.  As the new dependency theory suggests, developing 
countries and least developed countries (LDCs), such as Vietnam and Myanmar, diametrically shifted their 
policies from import substitution to export-driven orientation.  Moreover, the West’s economic slowdown 
                                                 
30 JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 238 (4th ed. 2014); Trade and Development 
Report (2014), at 67-68. 
31 John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: 
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16-17 (Narcís Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds. 2008); SONIA E. ROLLAND, 
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman, Editors’ 
Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman eds. 
2009).  
32 For the unipolar and multi-polar discussions, see generally Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN 
AFF. 23 (1990-91); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structure Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 
56:1 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015).   
33 Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POLICY 56, 60-62 (2011); David Nakamura, Obama Turns on 
Personal Appeal while Trying to Bolster His Pivot to Asia, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-to-asia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-
11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html; Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key 
Provisions and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (2016), at 1-6. 
34  Szu Ping Chan, New Trade War Threatens Global Order as TTIP Talks Stall, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 3, 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/03/new-trade-war-threatens-global-order-as-ttip-talks-stall/.  The 
EU concluded FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and resume negotiations for the EU-ASEAN FTA.  European 
Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015), at 30-32. 




and Asia’s increasing intraregional trade led to South-South FTAs representing two-thirds of FTAs and 
substantially outpacing the North-South FTAs.35  Different from their predecessors, more than 70% of 
today’s Asian trade pacts encompass WTO-plus commitments.36  This development illustrates how the 
assertive legalism of developing nations makes the South the center of the hub-and-spoke system. 
B. The Global South’s Practice of International Economic Law 
The theoretical and geopolitical explanations shed light on the Global South’s search for new norms to 
guide their international economic law development.  In Second Regionalism, APEC’s formation escalated 
aspirations for Asian integration.  Nevertheless, the institutional weakness of APEC’s soft-law approach has 
crippled the intended result of the Bogor Goals to achieve “free and open trade and investment in the Asia-
Pacific” by 2020.37  Renewed momentum for regionalism surged after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  
Widespread frustrations over US-dominated global financial institutions invigorated the ASEAN+3 
framework for currency stability.38 
At the inception of Third Regionalism, China and Japan vigorously vied for the regional leadership.  
The East Asian Vision Group, set up under the ASEAN+3 structure, proposed the East Asian Free Trade 
Area (EAFTA) in 2001. 39   While Beijing backed the EAFTA initiative, Tokyo countered it with the 
alternative ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) in 2006.40  In Japan’s 
                                                 
35 World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (2011) 
[World Trade Report 2011], at 52-53.  In 2015, Asia’s intraregional trade was 57.1%, higher than intra-regional trade 
in North America (64%) and lower than the European Union (EU) (63%).  Asian Economic Integration Report (2016), 
at 18. 
36 See e.g., Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 431 
(2013), at 8-9 (finding that 77% of surveyed FTAs in Asia partially or completely include Singapore issues). 
37 See 1994 Leaders’ Declaration, Nov. 15, 1994 (stating that industrialized economies and developing economies 
should achieve the goals by 2010 and 2020, respectively). 
38 The “ASEAN+3” framework includes ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea.  Shujiro Urata, Constructing 
and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian Perspective, No. 449 (2013), at 7.  
The result was the creation of the currency swap arrangement called the Chiang Mai Initiative, the predecessor to the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation Agreement. 
39 Summary of Stock-Taking Report on the ASEAN Plus Three Economic and Financial Cooperation, in Report of 
the East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG) 43, 43-46 (2013); Christopher M. Kent, East Asian Integration Towards An 
East Asian Economic Community, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 665 (2017), at 23.  
40 In addition, Japan favored the ASEAN+6-based Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) 
because it was based on Japan’s proposal and it was the work of the Japanese government-funded think tank, the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).  Rodolfo C. Severino, Japan’s Relations with ASEAN, 
in ASEAN-JAPAN RELATIONS 17, 27-28 (Takashi Shiraishi & Takaaki Kojima eds. 2014). 




view, the CEPEA could deepen the foundation of the Fukuda Doctrine by enhancing ASEAN-Japan ties, 
and the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand would counterbalance Chinese influence.41   
During the same period, the FTAAP proposal and US accession to the TPP further complicated the 
roadmap for Asian regionalism.42  To avoid being marginalized and fortify the bloc’s centrality, ASEAN 
states introduced the framework for the “ASEAN-led process” to integrate FTA partners in 2011.43  Based 
on ASEAN’s 2012 Guiding Principles for the RCEP, the 16-party negotiations essentially merged EAFTA 
and CEPEA proposals and expect to create the world’s most significant mega-regional deal by 2018.44  In 
my view, the converging polices of ASEAN, China and India illustrate the status of the RCEP in Asian 
economic powers’ contemporary practice of international law and represent the assertive legalism of the 
Global South in pursuing the NREO. 
1. ASEAN 
Contrary to the common misconception that China has dominated RCEP negotiations, in reality the 
FTA has been driven by ASEAN.45  While China and Japan could not agree on the EAFTA and the CEPEA 
proposals, the two largest Asian economies compromised by enabling ASEAN to drive the RCEP process.  
From legal and political perspectives, relying on the existing frameworks of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC 
constitutes the most feasible option for the unprecedented mega-regional pact.  The ASEAN-initiated 
RCEP would also serve as a normative basis for pro-development FTAs. 
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more pro-active in RCEP negotiations other than a significant increase in the number of participants in the Chinse 
delegation.”). 




ASEAN’s internal and external integration provides the foundation for the RCEP that covers ASEAN’s 
ten member states and six FTA partners.  While the existing literature predominantly links the RCEP to 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, it is incorrect to ignore the implementation of the AEC.46  The 1967 Bangkok Declaration 
gave birth to ASEAN by forming a loose security alliance that sought to contain widespread communism.47  
Resting upon the Indonesian concepts of musyawarah and mufakat, the postcolonial mind-set led to the 
“ASEAN way,” which established the bloc’s non-intervention principle based on consultation and 
consensus.48   
The constitutional moment was the enactment of the ASEAN Charter to codify the established practice 
and confer legal personality on ASEAN “as an inter-governmental” organization.49  Distinguishable from 
the super-national EU, ASEAN has operated under the soft-law horizontal integration model rather than a 
top-down, hard-law approach.  A result of this difference is the lack of ASEAN law’s “direct effect” to 
override domestic law.  Although the Charter requires members to “take all necessary measures” to 
implement ASEAN treaties, national constitutions are unlikely to be interpreted as granting such treaties 
self-executing power.50 
As an integral part of the RCEP, the AEC represents a breakthrough in the NREO.  In 2015, the 
creation of the AEC culminated ASEAN’s internal integration that began with the 1993 ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA).51  The AEC architecture comprises new-generation South-based pacts.  To remedy the 
AFTA’s low-utilization, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) consolidated previous 
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49 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007) [ASEAN Charter], art. 3. 
50 ASEAN Charter, art. 5:2; see also Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law: Challenges to 
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agreements on goods and reduced non-tariff barriers.52  As of 2017, the negotiations under the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) have led to the ratification of nine packages of services 
commitments.53  The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) streamlined the schedule of 
reservations and enhanced the investor-state arbitration mechanism.54  These commitments and the target 
of the AEC Blueprint 2025 to build “a highly integrated and cohesive economy” collectively form the 
benchmark for RCEP negotiations.55 
A key point should be highlighted.  The new Blueprint’s “global ASEAN” initiative places the RCEP 
as ASEAN’s priority.56  From 2002 to 2017, ASEAN concluded six ASEAN+1 FTAs with seven Asia-
Pacific partners, including Australia, China and India.57  Akin to the AEC, the ASEAN+1 FTAs have 
strengthened the notion of ASEAN centrality, which is mandated by the ASEAN Charter to secure the 
bloc’s economic and geopolitical relevance.58  This concept empowers ASEAN to be an indispensable 
middle power in Asian regionalism. 59   Although policy debates on the RCEP have revolved around 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, their differences in legal structures and commitments could endanger the RCEP.  The 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) is the most comprehensive single-undertaking FTA.60  
Other ASEAN+1 FTAs have followed the incremental approach by enacting a framework agreement that 
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facilitates the conclusion of sectoral agreements on trade in goods, services, investment and dispute 
settlement.  The “incomplete” exception is the ASEAN-Japan FTA that merely finalized the agreement on 
goods because of Tokyo’s reliance on higher commitments in seven bilateral FTAs with ASEAN states.61   
Significantly, notwithstanding the treaty-making power provision under the ASEAN Charter, the 
conferral of the EU concept of competence by member states on ASEAN to conclude treaties does not 
extend to those that will “create obligations upon individual” states.62  Thus, the Charter did not alter the 
negotiating practice of ASEAN+1 FTAs or the RCEP.  Seeking the converged position at the “ASEAN 
Caucus” meeting prior to RCEP negotiations is perceived as a political exercise rather than a legal 
obligation.63  Therefore, political consensus among ten ASEAN states is essential to ensure the status of the 
AEC in the NREO and to fortify the concept of the ASEAN centrality in the RCEP. 
2. China 
As part of the Global South, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as a global economic 
power since its open-door policy commenced in 1978.  Based on the evolution of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, the Beijing Consensus allegedly provides developing nations with an alternative model to the 
Washington Consensus.64  China’s trade strategy illustrates its changing international law practice.  Its 
accession to the UN and the WTO was motivated by a desire to assert the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  In Third Regionalism, China has transformed from a passive participant to an assertive 
stakeholder on global rule-making.  The PRC’s new great power status under the principle of “peaceful 
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development,” which replaced “peaceful rise” that suggested Sino-centric hegemony, has galvanized the Xi 
Jinping administration to fill the political vacuum in the wake of US isolationism.65 
Against this backdrop, three prime considerations underpin China’s legal and political approach to the 
RCEP and other FTAs.  First, as the largest RCEP economy, which accounts for one third of RCEP GDP, 
this FTA augments China’s right of discourse in international law.66  China has been a beneficiary of the 
capitalist, neoliberal trading system.  The post-Mao regime has never challenged the normality of the 
“Western” rules that sustain the system.  Instead, China has maximized its influence over global rule-making.  
Being a core RCEP member allows China to construct the legal pathway to the FTAAP.  The Obama-
backed TPP once posed threats to Beijing’s strategy.  China’s TPP standpoint is exemplified by its 
acceleration of bilateral FTAs and the RCEP, as well as its experiment with higher-level liberalization in the 
Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone.67  Ironically, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the TPP pushed 
Washington’s Asian allies to embrace the RCEP and enabled Beijing to carry the torch for free trade and 
globalization.   
Second, an interrelated legal controversy is Section 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO, 
which stipulates that the provisions allowing WTO members to treat China as a non-market economy “shall 
expire 15 years after the date of accession.”68  The non-market economy status legalized foreign countries’ 
use of “surrogate” prices in anti-dumping proceedings, thus making it easier to find Chinese exporters liable 
for dumping.69  Rather than attacking the normative value of Section 15 that it deems unfair,  China has 
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resorted to FTAs to circumvent the provision.  The ASEAN-China FTA illustrates such efforts, as it accords 
China “full market economy” status to the exclusion of WTO rules.70   
Despite the statutory expiration of Section 15 in December 2016, the United States, the EU and Japan 
declined to alter the non-market economy methodology owing to political sensitivity involving the inflow 
of Chinese goods. 71   In response, Beijing filed concurrent WTO complaints against Washington and 
Brussels.72  The RCEP could compel Japan to accept the ASEAN-China FTA practice of recognizing China 
as a market economy and thus marginalize US and EU positions in the interpretation of world trade law.  
Lastly, the RCEP will advance China’s economic interests in the NREO.  Empirical data demonstrate 
that the Chinese economy alone could gain $88 billion if the TPP failed and the RCEP were passed, and 
this amount is $16 billion more than the scenario where both mega-regionals came into effect.73  The RCEP 
is a key instrument to implement China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, in which the National People’s Congress first 
placed the “One Belt, One Road” initiative as a national priority in 2016.74  This initiative fortifies China’s 
long-standing approach to South-South cooperation that emphasizes concessional loans for infrastructure 
building to facilitate the export of Chinese production, capital and labor. 
Contrary to the assertion of Beijing and pro-government academics, I argue that OBOR is primarily 
based on ambitious yet ambiguous policy statements that are far from legal commitments.75  What was 
patently ignored in discourse is the financial risks that could arise from investment in many of the 68 OBOR 
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members such as Iraq and Palestine.76  OBOR’s few substantive results include the creation of the China-
led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which fills Asian states’ infrastructure needs that global 
financial institutions fail to meet.  As more than 60 members joined the AIIB, including all RCEP countries 
except Japan, the bank will facilitate ASEAN+6 economic cooperation through its development projects.77 
OBOR also ascended to the PRC State Council’s new FTA strategy, which goes beyond trade 
commitments and extends to e-commerce and environmental protection. 78   Four of China’s FTAs 
encompass 13 RCEP members.79  The ASEAN-China FTA is indicative.  As Asia’s largest South-South 
FTA that is currently in force, the ASEAN-China FTA was created under a framework agreement and four 
subsequent agreements signed between 2002 and 2009.80  Despite criticism of its low liberalization level, the 
ASEAN-China FTA’s “living agreement” design led to the 2011 second package of services commitments 
and the 2015 protocol to upgrade goods and investment commitments.81  Moreover, instead of joining the 
ASEAN-China FTA, Hong Kong concluded a free-standing FTA with ASEAN in November 2017.82  The 
ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA, the amended ASEAN-China FTA, and China’s recent FTAs with Australia and 
Korea will shape the RCEP in line with OBOR. 
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India was the key stakeholder of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement that 
championed South-South cooperation.83  In the 1990s, the bipartisan consensus formulated the Look East 
Policy in order to forge the neglected economic link to East Asia and counteract the rise of China.84  This 
post-Cold War strategy substantiated the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement and bilateral FTAs with 
three ASEAN countries, Japan and Korea.85  Despite these legal efforts, India is yet to be at the core of 
Asian regionalism.  New Delhi is not an APEC member and it stands outside the vertically-integrated supply 
chain of the East Asian market.86  Economic data evidence India’s de facto isolation from ASEAN.  China 
and Korea constitute 15.2% and 5.4% of ASEAN’s total trade, respectively, but India accounts for merely 
2.6%.87  While ASEAN primarily trades electrical devices with Asia-Pacific countries, ASEAN-India trade 
predominantly involves raw materials, such as dairy and mineral products.88 
In Third Regionalism, India’s most compelling move is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Act East 
Policy,” which was declared in Myanmar in 2014.89  The new policy adopts a more action-based approach 
than its predecessor by reinvigorating defense and economic ties with Asian trading partners.  Thus, the 
RCEP serves as the vehicle for India to be included in Asia-Pacific integration and benefits the “Make in 
India” campaign to make the nation a manufacturing and services hub. 90  The mega-regional pact will 
provide Indian businesses with market access to Australia and China.  More importantly, akin to Beijing’s 
motivation, the shaping of the RCEP empowers New Delhi to be recognized as a great power in global 
rule-making. 
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For RCEP countries, India’s participation in the pact presents opportunities and risks.  The RCEP legal 
framework that accommodates India and ASEAN’s LDCs, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
(collectively known as CLMV countries) presents the normative foundation for the Global South.  Given 
China’s economic slowdown, India’s astonishing 7% GDP growth rate and infrastructure needs will yield 
additional trade gains.91  The jeopardy arises from Sino-Indian clashes that range from border disputes to 
leadership competition, which echoes China’s discord with Japan as to the pathways to Asian regionalism.  
To check Chinese dominance, Singapore and Vietnam within ASEAN have actively called for India’s greater 
role.92  Markedly, India did not join the Beijing-led OBOR.93  The Modi-Abe alliance created the Asia-Africa 
Growth Corridor that resembles OBOR by focusing on infrastructure projects and capacity building.94  Such 
interstate dynamics inevitably influence the RCEP progress. 
India’s conservative stance on trade liberalization has led Beijing to accuse New Delhi of “selfishly” 
obstructing RCEP negotiations and prompted ASEAN states to consider the “ASEAN Minus X” formula.95  
India’s insistence on the RCEP’s single-undertaking structure departs from the ASEAN-India FTA, which 
is modeled after the ASEAN-China FTA’s incremental building-block approach.96  The ASEAN-India 
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services and investment agreements were only concluded in 2014, 11 years after the inking of the framework 
agreement.97  The prolonged process reflects India’s irreconcilable politics of protectionism. 
On the WTO front, India applies MFN tariff rates up to 150% to support its domestic agriculture.98  In 
the ASEAN-India FTA, Indian agricultural projects are mostly immune to liberalization because they are 
either excluded or scheduled under the sensitive track.99  India has been the WTO forerunner for liberalizing 
labor mobility, known as Mode 4 within the definition of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). 100   This position facilitates the exportation of Indian professional services in information 
technology (IT) and other areas.  As the ASEAN-India FTA has exacerbated deficits in trade in goods 
without generating sufficient services exports, the Modi government “will not repeat the mistake” in 
ASEAN-Indian negotiations.101  Hence, New Delhi demanded the single-undertaking formula adopted for 
the AANZFTA, so that concessions for tariff cuts will be tied to the potential gains for services market 
access. 
As for controversial intellectual property (IP) provisions, the Indian position conflicts with Japan’s and 
Korea’s proposals that intend to “TPP-nize” the RCEP standards.102  A key example is the protection of 
data exclusivity under the TPP.  Article 18.50 of the TPP, which the CPTPP suspended, exceeds the 
requirement of Article 39 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
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(TRIPS).103  Pharmaceutical companies normally invest dramatically in developing clinical trial data.  For a 
fixed period of time, the TRIPS-plus protection obliges countries to prohibit such data from being utilized 
by subsequent manufacturers for generic drugs.  Data exclusivity would give a monopoly to developed 
nations’ corporations and significantly undermine the granting of compulsory licenses for handling public 
health crises, including India’s tuberculosis epidemic. 104   The RCEP’s draft investment chapter that 
incorporates IP rights in the definition of investments eligible for ISDS further fortifies India’s resistance.105  
These issues illustrate India’s legal considerations that may compromise RCEP commitments.   
III. Key Components of RCEP Negotiations 
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this article presents the NREO as the new 
normative framework for understanding Third Regionalism.  Different from the NIEO that is preoccupied 
with the North-South conflicts, the RCEP represents the NREO that facilitates South-South FTAs.  The 
theoretical underpinning of the NREO is thus reinforced by the assertive legalism of the Global South in 
transforming the dependency dilemma into active FTA policies.   
Notably, the Guiding Principles have influenced the RCEP’s legal structure.  First of all, de jure 
integration that replaces intra-RCEP trade pacts is not intended.  Instead, the RCEP will improve five 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, and it will not “detract from” commitments under existing FTAs.106  This approach poses 
the challenges to eliminate the noodle bowl syndrome of Asian FTAs.  In addition, given “the different 
levels of development,” the RCEP will allow for flexibility by incorporating SDT provisions.107  As RCEP 
members accepted India’s request for adopting the single-undertaking approach, the degree of policy space 
accorded to LDCs will be a critical trade-off for partners to reach consensus.108   
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Political complexity and capacity constraints have added further complications to the RCEP.  As of 
2017, RCEP negotiations were finalized for the chapter on economic and technical cooperation and the 
chapter on small and medium-sized enterprises.109  The core components that require the “Grand Bargain” 
to involve trade in goods, trade in services and investment will determine whether the RCEP can be 
completed as the new “ASEAN++” architecture by 2018.110  The increase from 60 to 800 negotiators from 
16 countries illustrates the complexity of RCEP talks.111  The insertion of ongoing negotiation of the China-
Japan-Korea FTA into RCEP negotiations made the dynamics more intricate.112  Equally significant, certain 
governments’ limited capacity has hindered officials from negotiating ROOs and trade facilitation in parallel 
working group meetings.113  Another hindrance is that political issues, which cause conflicts between trade 
liberalization and constitutional constraints, can only be handled at the ministerial level.114   
Below I will analyze the legal implications for the RCEP’s critical areas.  From a comparative law 
perspective, the trade in goods issues are to be discussed with uneven tariff concessions and low utilization 
rates of ASEAN+1 FTAs, as well as the impact of the RCEP on fragmented ROOs.  Services commitments 
are to be discussed with constitutional challenges and ASEAN’s legal structure of professional mobility.  By 
examining the legal positions of Australia, China, India, Indonesia and the EU, investment matters focus 
on the contentious investor-state arbitration mechanisms. 
A. Tariff Eliminations and the Rules of Origin 
Tariff cuts are the most transparent aspect of trade liberalization.  The existing analyses on tariff 
eliminations under ASEAN+1 FTAs often neglect the drastic tariff reductions in the ASEAN Economic 
Community.  To achieve the RCEP’s goal of “the high level of tariff liberalization” and consolidation of 
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Asian FTAs, going beyond the tariff concessions under ASEAN+1 FTAs and the intra-ASEAN ATIGA is 
paramount.115  A comparison of five external FTAs readily demonstrates that the AANZFTA is the most 
liberalized FTA, achieving 95.7% of the average tariff elimination coverage.116  The result is by no means a 
surprise, given the developed nation status of Australia and New Zealand and their progressive FTA 
trajectories.   
In contrast, India’s conservative posture made the ASEAN-India the lowest-level FTA, with 79.6% 
coverage.117  Under the ASEAN-India FTA, the average coverage of ASEAN states exceeds 90%, but 
Indonesia’s tariff liberalization is merely 48.7%.118  The AEC’s most noteworthy achievement is ASEAN-6 
countries’ elimination of 98.9% of tariff lines and CLMV countries’ phase in of remaining duties for sensitive 
products by 2018.119  Consequently, I propose that the AANZFTA and the ATIGA should serve as the 
bases for RCEP tariff commitments.  
Streamlining tariff eliminations of India, Indonesia and CLMV countries would make the RCEP the 
model for South-based FTAs.  As evidenced by the ASEAN-India FTA and the bilateral FTAs of Japan 
and Korea with ASEAN countries, agricultural trade liberalization is key to the RCEP.120  The AANZFTA 
provides the best practices, as it eliminated tariffs on substantial agricultural products when the agreement 
took effect.121  To be a comprehensive FTA, the RCEP’s breakthrough in agriculture relies upon two key 
factors: the tariff elimination timeframes and potential market access.   
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The tariff phase-in periods, which extend to 18 years under the ASEAN-Japan FTA and 30 years under 
the TPP, exemplify critical trade-offs for the RCEP.122  In terms of market access, keeping Japan’s TPP 
commitment that raises its quota for Australian rice would be linked to the export of Japanese vehicles.123  
In 2016, India proposed a three-tiered tariff approach that grants RCEP countries 42.5%-80% tariff cuts, 
depending on three different categories.124  The motivation was India’s defensive position on agriculture 
and the significant $52.7 billion trade deficit with China.125  New Delhi subsequently dropped the proposal 
because of RCEP members’ objections and India’s reassessed gains in services and investment under the 
pact. 
As the largest mega-regional initiative, the RCEP’s harmonization of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the ATIGA 
impacts the businesses’ utilization of the FTAs.  In comparison, NAFTA’s usage rate surpasses 60%, but 
the utilization rate of Asian FTAs is only 28%.126  The strikingly low usage of ASEAN+1 FTAs, such as 
5.1% of the ASEAN-India FTA for exporters and 2.3% of the ASEAN-Japan FTA for importers, has 
nullified the legal efforts for preferential tariff treatment.127  The most used ASEAN FTAs are the ATIGA 
in exports and the ASEAN-China FTA in imports, with a utilization rate of only slightly above 30% for 
each. 128   Conventional answers to this problem are the limited access to the FTA information, low 
preference margins compared with MFN tariffs and complex ROOs. 129  An oft-neglected factor is the 
expanded commitments of the Information Technology Agreement, a plurilateral WTO agreement that 
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eliminates tariffs on IT products.130  As 11 RCEP partners are parties to the Agreement, zero tariff treatment 
for electronic devices renders the use of FTAs redundant.131 
Complex and distinct ROOs in overlapping Asian FTAs have contributed to the noodle bowl syndrome 
and inhibited FTA usage.  Built on the ROO reform agenda in the AEC Blueprint 2025, the RCEP should 
consolidate the best practices of regional ROOs.132  Change in Tariff Classification (CTC) and Regional 
Value Content (RVC) are the most common ROOs in ASEAN FTAs.133  While the former qualitatively 
assesses whether the products are classified under tariff schedules different from original materials, the latter 
quantitatively examines whether the products meet the FTA value-added thresholds.134 
Failure to meet the ROOs would disqualify exporters from receiving the certificate of origin for FTA 
preferences.  The ATIGA and most ASEAN+1 FTAs have adopted the flexible co-equal rule, which 
permits ROOs to be satisfied by either the CTC or the RVC.135  The ASEAN-India FTA is now the sole 
exception to the rule after the 2015 protocol to the ASEAN-China FTA that had its ROO requirement 
relaxed to a CVC or RVC of 40%.136  In terms of the certificates of origin, all of the five ASEAN+1 FTAs 
have permitted third-country invoicing and movement certificates, so that exporters can manage foreign 
exchange risks and logistics operations.137  These evolved practices and harmonized ROOs provide the 
model for the RCEP. 
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Additionally, the RCEP will consolidate the regional supply chain by filling the ROO gap among 
ASEAN FTAs.  To illustrate, Chinese automotive companies plan to expand their operations in Thailand 
by assembling completely knocked-down units imported from China and exporting finalized cars to 
Indonesia and Australia.138  The ROOs of the AANZFTA, the ATIGA and the ASEAN-China FTA apply 
the RVC of 40% for automotive parts and vehicles.139  While the completed cars sold in ASEAN are entitled 
to ATIGA or ASEAN-China FTA preferences, those exported to Australia may be denied preferential 
tariffs under the AANZFTA.  The legal obstacle occurs because the AANZFTA’s “cumulative provision” 
does not recognize the value of the cars’ Chinese components for the RVC calculation.140  In other words, 
the lack of the linkage between the ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs obstructs the needs of contemporary 
transactions.  Consequently, an ASEAN+6 cumulative provision under the RCEP will consolidate ASEAN 
FTAs and propel the paradigm change in Asian regionalism. 
B. Services Liberalization and Professional Mobility 
The significance of trade in services is no less than that of tariff eliminations.  In Third Regionalism, 
financial and logistics services underpin cross-border trade in goods.  The intimate correlation between the 
two modes of trade is evidenced by a 10% growth in trade in services augmenting trade in goods by 6%.141  
To implement RCEP countries’ commitments to the UN Sustainable Development Goals, services trade is 
essential to development policy that eradicates poverty and increases employment.142  For RCEP members 
such as Malaysia and Thailand, modernizing services will enable them to escape from the “middle income 
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trap” that stagnates economy due to the eroding labor-intensive advantage.143  In developing countries and 
LDCs, foreign direct investments (FDIs) are increasingly associated with services providers that help 
buttress the welfare of the poor through job creation.144  Labor mobility results in remittances, which also 
benefit the Global South for development purposes. 
The TPP’s unforeseen future and the fact that no ASEAN countries are participating in the WTO Trade 
in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations enable the RCEP to set the standards for Asian FTAs.145  Based 
on “the GATS and ASEAN+1 FTAs,” the RCEP’s target is to “substantially eliminate” barriers to services 
trade.146  To ensure ASEAN centrality, the RCEP should take evolving AFAS commitments into account.  
The AFAS’s “package” structure is similarly incorporated in ASEAN’s FTAs with China and Korea. 147  
ASEAN+1 FTAs cover services commitments except for the ASEAN-Japan FTA.148  Although the 2014 
ASEAN-India Services Agreement is the latest services pact in external FTAs, its core commitments in 
financial and transport services rarely exceed the WTO level.149   
Contrary to the conventional understanding that ASEAN states committed most in the comprehensive 
AANZFTA, intra-ASEAN commitments in the seventh package of AFAS commitments for the first time 
exceeded those under the AANZFTA.150  Moreover, although the low degree of the first package of 
commitments under the ASEAN-China FTA suffers from “GATS-minus” situations, the second package 
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has brought it up to par with the ASEAN-Korea FTA. 151   These developments exhibit that AFAS 
commitments should form the benchmark for the RCEP.  The package structure could also prevent 
repeating the TPP and TTIP mistakes to aim to achieve comprehensive or high-standard services 
liberalization without an incremental approach in light of protectionist politics. 
With respect to the modality of services liberalization, the AFAS and ASEAN+1 FTAs adopt the 
GATS-like positive list approach, whereas EU and US FTAs, such as the TPP, employ the negative list 
approach.  While the positive list modality allows FTA partners to retain regulatory sovereignty to schedule 
services commitments, the more aggressive negative list approach will enhance transparency and cover 
newly developed services.152  Remarkably, the China-Korea FTA signals China’s first use of the negative list 
approach and indicates its changing position in services commitments.153  In the bilateral FTA, China and 
Australia scheduled their commitments on positive and negative lists, respectively.154  However, Beijing 
agreed to follow the negative list modality in the subsequent round of negotiations.155 
A different hybrid mechanism is included in the positive list-based Malaysia-New Zealand FTA, under 
which Malaysia agreed to “commence re-negotiation of the specific commitments” if it concludes an 
agreement on a negative list with a third country.156  These dynamics and the collective lobbying of four 
TiSA members influenced the RCEP to be negotiated under an innovative positive list formula with “value 
added” components. 157   This approach provides guidance for South-based regionalism because it 
incorporates negative list advantages without overly compromising regulatory sovereignty.  New 
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components include the “ratchet” that imposes a standstill by disallowing future governments from 
adopting more restrictive measures, as well as the MFN-forward design, which requires a RCEP country to 
automatically extend any services concessions under its prospective bilateral agreements to other RCEP 
members.158 
As for substantive commitments, the RCEP will be modeled after the GATS and the AFAS that cover 
four modes of the services trade: Mode 1 (cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption abroad), Mode 3 
(commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons or MNP).159  ASEAN+1 FTAs reflect 
the WTO trend.  Mode 2, which seldom involves hard bargains, is most committed, whereas professional 
mobility under Mode 4 is least committed. 160   The existing literature rarely addresses the potential 
constitutional challenges to services negotiations.  For example, Article 12 of the Philippine Constitution 
and Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution mandate that natural resources be “owned by” or “controlled 
by the State.”161  These provisions may outlaw the RCEP’s Mode 3 foreign equity reforms in mining and 
forest sectors.  The Philippines’ constitutional principle that confines professional practice to citizens equally 
challenges Mode 4 liberalization.162  The RCEP’s external pressure to remove constitutional obstacles will 
similarly benefit ASEAN integration. 
In my view, to accelerate much-needed professional mobility in the Asia-Pacific and refute the prevalent 
low-level contention, the RCEP should be built upon the AEC’s Mode 4 commitments and mutual 
recognition arrangements (MRAs).  This focus will create TPP-plus benefits for the Global South.  Other 
than the poverty reduction effect of remittances, circular migration has brought back skills that modernize 
the economies of the original countries.163  Despite the pro-development effect, the WTO’s liberalization 
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over the MNP was restrictive because of the concern about creating the back door to immigration.  This 
unfounded misconception has also amounted to global protectionism.   
In terms of Mode 4, US FTAs turned drastically conservative after Singapore and Chile FTAs allocated 
additional quotas for work visas.164  Among ASEAN+1 FTAs, the AANZFTA is by far the only one that 
includes an MNP chapter.165  Even the most recent ASEAN-India Services Agreement merely provides 
definitions of natural persons without substantive MNP provisions. 166  On the bilateral level, the most 
notable example is the movement of nurses and care workers under Japan’s FTAs with four ASEAN 
states.167  Nevertheless, limited sectors in the commitments and legal obstacles, such as qualification and 
language requirements, have impeded the intended results.168 
The RCEP negotiators have discussed the possibility of including a MNP chapter or annex.169  The 
AEC’s goal to facilitate the movement of “skilled” labor rather than more general migration provisions 
could provide guidance for the mega-regional agreement.170  Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, the ASEAN 
MNP Agreement and MRAs liberalize professional mobility.171  The Agreement, which will supersede AFAS 
Mode 4 commitments, encompasses services trade on a non-permanent basis.  To avoid immigration 
concerns, it resembles the GATS by excluding ASEAN governments’ “measures affecting natural persons 
seeking access to the employment market” and “measures regarding citizenship, residence or employment 
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on a permanent basis.”172  In other words, the governments retain their regulatory power to maintain visa 
requirements for public purposes, provided that the treaty benefits are not impaired.173   
Furthermore, the implementation of ASEAN MRAs that cover eight professions provide valuable 
experiences.174  Compared with APEC and TPP’s soft-law schemes, the ASEAN pacts on engineering and 
architecture services are most conspicuous.175  The regional level professional institutions and national 
regulatory bodies have created a three-step registration process.  For instance, an engineer who meets the 
educational and experience requirements can be first certified by the domestic body, which submits the 
application to the ASEAN committee.176  Upon approval as an “ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” 
the engineer is qualified to apply to be a foreign engineer in another ASEAN country.177 
The ASEAN MRA on tourism professionals exemplifies a rare scheme that facilitates “unregulated” 
services due to the absence of international standards for tourism services providers. The MRA not only 
created a database to assist registered tourism professionals, but also consolidated the regional tourism 
industry by developing competency standards for 32 job titles. 178   ASEAN’s experiences in Mode 4 
liberalization and MRAs are integral to the RCEP, which aims to achieve “comprehensive” services 
commitments.179  Given the procrastinated status of the TPP and the TiSA, the AEC’s consolidation of 
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commitments in the prospective ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement will further prompt the RCEP to 
fortify services trade in the Asia-Pacific.180  
C. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Trade in goods, trade in services and investment form cardinal pillars of the RCEP.  Investment law 
and policy is critical to FDI inflows that catalyze pro-poor development in the Global South.  Given the 
slowing Chinese economy, ASEAN overtook China in attracting FDI for the first time in 2013.181  Under 
the AEC Blueprint 2025, ASEAN will strengthen the ACIA-based investment regime to enhance its regional 
competitiveness.182  As of 2017, ASEAN and other six countries agreed to expedite bilateral or plurilateral 
negotiations, including investment liberalization, on a request and offer basis.183 
One should note that the signing of the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement left the ASEAN-Japan 
FTA the sole ASEAN+1 FTA without an investment component.184  RCEP negotiations on investment 
“promotion, protection, facilitation and liberalization” are built upon the intra-ASEAN ACIA and external 
ASEAN FTAs.185  Nevertheless, these instruments vary in substantive provisions on covered investments, 
MFN and national treatment, and compensation following expropriation. 186   The most contentious 
investment issue that may amount to a “deal breaker” is ISDS provisions, which entitle foreign investors to 
sue host states in international judicial bodies.  ISDS was initially designed to overcome the local court bias 
and the hurdle for exercising diplomatic protection by investors’ home states in public international law.  
The ICSID Convention crystalized the multilateral efforts to adjudicate investor-state disputes under the 
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auspices of the World Bank.187  However, four RCEP members (India, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) are 
not parties to the Convention.188   
In line with the universal trend, Asian BITs and FTAs often include ISDS provisions because they are 
perceived to incentivize investments.189  The ACIA and ASEAN+1 FTAs follow the modality of the US 
Model BIT and the NAFTA and go beyond earlier BITs by incorporating more detailed arbitration 
procedures than the ICSID Convention.190  In reality, the “ASEAN way” and the fear of undermining 
relations with the governments have deterred foreign investors from filing complaints against host states.  
Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar remains the only case that arose from ASEAN FTAs.191  A Singaporean company 
challenged the Myanmar government’s expropriation of a joint venture brewery, but the Tribunal dismissed 
the case on jurisdictional grounds based on the interpretation of pre-ACIA agreements.192 
In Third Regionalism, the soaring number of investor-state disputes has shaped the NREO and the 
stance of the Global South.  Since the 2000s, reported ISDS cases have increased fivefold, and the number 
of Asia-Pacific states as respondents doubled the number as claimants.193  ISDS provisions became the 
source of global protectionism and underpin public criticism against FTAs.  ISDS is perceived to be 
undemocratic for permitting foreign corporations to bypass domestic courts’ jurisdiction.  It is also criticized 
for creating a “regulatory chill” that makes public policy measures vulnerable to foreign investors’ legal 
challenges. 
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The case of Philip Morris v. Australia changed the landscape and resulted in the tobacco carve-out clause 
of the TPP’s ISDS provisions.194  In this case, Philip Morris challenged Australia’s plain cigarette packaging 
legislation that intends to reduce smoking.195  Although the Virginia-based company was unable to resort to 
the Australia-US FTA that does not include ISDS, corporate restructuring entitled its Hong Kong subsidiary 
to sue Canberra under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.196  In the Tribunal’s view, “this arbitration constitutes 
an abuse of rights” because the dispute was foreseeable to Phillip Morris at the time of the restructuring.197  
Despite the result, the case incurred public outcry and states’ concerns about regulatory sovereignty and 
legal expenses.  The direct response was the TPP’s exclusion of tobacco control measures.  This carve-out 
has also been adopted in the Australia-Singapore FTA and will likely influence the RCEP’s ISDS design.198  
In addition to Australia’s position, a compromise of RCEP stake-holding countries is of significance to 
the investor-state arbitration mechanisms under South-based FTAs.  India and Indonesia are most resistant 
to “pro-investor” ISDS.  As the No. 1 ISDS target among RCEP countries, India has been the respondent 
in 21 disputes and the amount of compensation that investors claimed reached $12.3 billion.199  For example, 
the Dobhol power plant project dispute led US-based Enron, General Electric and Bechtel to file nine cases 
against India under various BITs.200   
Other than “losing control” over its energy policy, India lost the case of White Industries, in which an 
Australian company challenged the delays of the Indian judicial system.201  Based on the Australia-India 
BIT’s MFN clause, the Tribunal held that New Delhi breached the obligation under its BIT with Kuwait to 
                                                 
194 See generally TPP, art. 29.5. 
195 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (2015), paras. 7-8 & 89. 
196 Id. paras. 536-70; Julien Chaisse & Shintaro Hamanaka, Understanding Asian Investment Complexity: What to Do About 
It? IDS Discussion Paper No. 626 (2017), at 12-13; Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 
2015 (2016), at 15. 
197 Philip Morris Asia Ltd., supra note 195, para. 580-85. 
198 See Agreement to Amend the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (2016), art. 22 (“No claim may be brought 
under this Section in respect of a tobacco control measure of a Party.”); Tania S.L. Voon, Consolidating International 
Investment Law: The Mega-Regionals as a Pathway Towards Multilateral Rules, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929145 (last visited Aug. 10, 2017), at 25 (stating that the 
amendment was “modelled on the TPP provision”). 
199 ISDS Review, supra note 193, at 52; see also Cecilia Olivet et. al., The Hidden Costs of RCEP and Corporate Trade 
Deals in Asia (2016), at 3-6 (“India alone has been the target of 40% of the cases filed against RCEP countries.”). 
200 Olivet et. al., supra note 199, at 9-10. 
201 Final Award, White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL (2011), para. 16.1.1. 




ensure an “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.”202  These incidences led India to redraft 
the Model BIT that significantly limits the access to ISDS by imposing the exhaustion of local remedies as 
the condition.203  For similar policy reasons, Indonesia has terminated 17 BITs since the government 
unilaterally abrogated its BIT with the Netherlands in 2014.204  In other words, the ACIA, ASEAN+1 FTAs 
and the RCEP will be the primary avenues by which foreign investors can utilize ISDS against Jakarta. 
Contrary to India and Indonesia, Korea and Japan are at the forefront of ISDS proposals in RCEP 
negotiations.205  Their position to “TPP-nize” RCEP ISDS provisions is to ensure that their significant 
investments in India and Southeast Asia are guaranteed.  Notably, China’s evolving position on ISDS stands 
unique in the Global South.  While Beijing’s “Westphalian fundamentalist” doctrine continues to apply to 
territorial disputes in arbitration, it has revamped the ISDS strategy in tandem with the increasingly active 
use of WTO disputes.206  For Beijing, investment arbitration benefits the OBOR initiative by protecting 
outbound Chinese FDIs and can hardly undermine the communist leadership.  China’s earlier BITs echo 
its 1993 reservation to the ICSID Convention that confines the jurisdiction of a tribunal to “compensation 
resulting from expropriation and nationalization.”207  Nonetheless, the Australia-China FTA remarkably 
expanded the ISDS application to cover violations of national treatment obligations.208  Although Beijing 
has yet to push for ISDS provisions vigorously, its changing practice will be critical to the RCEP. 
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The US model of ISDS provisions has been the model for ASEAN FTAs.  It was contended that the 
European model may shape the RCEP structure.209  This contention is problematic.  The EU’s proposal for 
creating a multilateral investment court through the appellate mechanism in bilateral FTAs has raised 
concerns about its practicability and implications for developing countries. 210   Given that the ICSID 
annulment proceedings are confined to limited grounds, the appellate system aims to increase the partiality, 
transparency and predictability of ISDS awards.211  Similar to the TPP, the EU-Singapore FTA merely 
includes references to a potential appellate mechanism. 212  Washington’s unclear stance that has halted 
negotiations of the TTIP makes its “Appeal Tribunal” provisions futile.213  By far, the EU only succeeded 
in incorporating its proposal in the FTAs with Canada and Vietnam.214 
The new EU trade policy is to evaluate the resumption of FTA negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia 
and eventually conclude the ASEAN-EU FTA.215  The RCEP negotiators should be advised that almost 
70% of ISDS cases against their countries were filed by European investors.216  The potential result that the 
EU could merely persuade less developed RCEP countries to accept the appellate mechanism suggests the 
neocolonial relationship, which trade dependency theorists envisioned.  More fundamentally, the legal 
dispute that substantially delayed the ratification of the EU-Singapore FTA has implications for ASEAN 
and the RCEP.  The Court of Justice of the European Union case concerned whether the EU was entitled 
to have exclusive competence to include ISDS provisions in the FTA and the Court ruled against the EU 
Commission. 217   In the Court’s view, the ISDS regime will remove disputes from domestic courts’ 
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jurisdiction and hence requires the consent of member states under the shared competence of EU law.218  
This decision would impose legal obstacles on the EU’s Asian FTAs and limit the impact of the ISDS 
proposal on the RCEP. 
IV. The Systemic Impact on Regional and Multilateral Trading Systems 
This article sheds light on the theoretical underpinning of the NREO, which explains the legal strategies 
of ASEAN, China and India to pursue the RCEP.  The discussion of the core elements of the RCEP 
buttresses the corollaries of the new dependency theory that the assertive legalism of the Global South can 
change its economic and development trajectory.  The RCEP will invigorate paradigm changes in Asian 
FTAs and constitute a normative foundation for the Global South in world trade law.   
The implementation of the AEC and ASEAN+1 FTAs provide the joint impetus for the goals of the 
AEC Blueprint 2025 and the RCEP.  From a global perspective, the mega-regional alliance will further 
influence the trading systems and international economic law.  The critical and systemic issues in Third 
Regionalism include normative conflicts of trade fragmentation.  Jurisdictional clashes under overlapping 
agreements inevitably require scrutiny of WTO and VCLT case law.  Equally critical matters involve the 
RCEP’s nexus with the APEC-based FTAAP after the US withdrawal from the TPP, as well as the RCEP’s 
pro-development operative mechanism. 
A. Normative Conflicts of Trade Fragmentation 
The 16-country RCEP will face new dynamics of trade fragmentation in international economic law, as 
the mega-FTA could further complicate the Noodle Bowl syndrome due to overlapping FTAs and BITs.  
Nevertheless, the RCEP’s consolidation of intra-RCEP trade and investment pacts could immensely benefit 
developing nations and the Doha Round.  Three types of normative conflicts amid fragmented trade rules 
have emerged in Third Regionalism and complicated the application of WTO law and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.   
First, the conventional phenomenon arises from the jurisdictional clashes between the WTO and FTAs.  
In Mexico – Soft Drinks, Mexico’s defense relied on the NAFTA’s forum exclusion clause when the United 
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States brought a WTO complaint against Mexico’s tax measures.219  Mexico argued that because the case 
constituted part of “a broader dispute” it had previously brought against Washington in NAFTA 
proceedings, the forum exclusion clause required the NAFTA to be the sole forum for the case. 220  The 
Appellate Body held that a panel’s declining its own jurisdiction would “diminish” a complaining party’s 
right under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).221  The Appellate Body further elaborated that 
although “legal impediments” may exclude the WTO’s jurisdiction, such impediments did not exist in the 
present case.222   
In a more recent case, Peru – Agricultural Products, Guatemala challenged the consistency of Peru’s Price 
Range System with the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT.223  Peru contended that Guatemala 
violated “good faith” obligations under the DSU, as Guatemala waived the right to bring the WTO 
complaint under their bilateral FTA.224  After scrutinizing paragraph 9 of Annex 2.3 of the FTA, the 
Appellate Body ruled that a waiver to relinquish DSU rights “must be made clearly” and “cannot be lightly 
assumed.”225  In other words, such provisions do not constitute the “legal impediments” that the Appellate 
Body explained in Mexico – Soft Drinks.226  Thus, based on WTO jurisprudence, even if the RCEP does not 
incorporate the “supremacy clause” that prioritizes the WTO Agreement, a forum exclusion clause can 
hardly be interpreted to bar the WTO’s jurisdiction.227  
Second, emerging FTA-FTA conflicts have arisen in tandem with proliferating trade pacts in Third 
Regionalism.  FTAs with overlapping geographical scopes led to more complex issues than the noodle bowl 
syndrome due to divergent ROOs.  For example, other than the WTO, Singapore could bring an identical 
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complaint against China under the bilateral FTA, the ASEAN-China FTA and the RCEP.  Forum shopping 
is a legal challenge.  In practice, de jure consolidation that enables a wider FTA to terminate intra-FTAs is an 
ideal yet a politically sensitive exercise.  A rare example is the Commonwealth of Independent States Free 
Trade Area that declared six bilateral FTAs “null and void” in 2012.228  During TPP negotiations, Australia, 
New Zealand and Singapore argued for the “clean slate” approach to supersede intra-TPP pacts.229  On the 
contrary, the United States vigorously opposed the proposal in order to keep its existing market access 
commitments under bilateral FTAs, such as FTAs with Australia and Korea.230  The end result is the TPP 
provision that merely allows the FTA “to coexist with” other agreements.231   
A cursory overview of the Guiding Principles for the RCEP suggests the same coexistence approach to 
ASEAN+1 FTAs.232  Nevertheless, the diversity of treaty language reveals more intricate interpretations 
than the TPP.  In their “relations to other agreements” provisions, the AANZFTA and the ASEAN-Japan 
FTA follow the three-phase approach that intra-RCEP bilateral FTAs adopted.233  Substantively, “[e]ach 
party reaffirms its rights and obligations under” existing agreements to which they are parties. 234  The 
ASEAN+1 FTA should not “be construed to derogate from” existing obligations arising from other 
agreements.235  Procedurally, a party “shall immediately consult with” another party should inconsistency 
between ASEAN+1 FTAs and other agreements materialize.236  
The ASEAN-Japan FTA endorses parallelism of FTAs by stressing the validity of a separate agreement 
between parties if it provides more favorable treatment. 237  The “more favorable” assessment can be 
quantitatively determined if a single-issue dispute involves tariffs or a particular mode of services trade.  
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However, multi-issue cases can complicate the qualitative application of the “more favorable” proviso.238  
The Korea-Vietnam FTA that identifies “more favorable treatment of goods, services, investment, or 
persons” is an attempt to provide higher certainty and could be a basis for the RCEP to detail the 
conditions.239 
Certain intra-RCEP FTAs, evidenced by the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the China-New Zealand FTA, 
encompass the interpretative role of “international law” in resolving treaty inconsistencies.240  Article 30 of 
the VCLT provides the authoritative guide on “successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter.”241  
The overlapping rights and obligations under the RCEP, ASEAN+1 FTAs and bilateral FTAs fall within 
the ambit of Article 30.  Presumably, the les posterior rule codified in Article 30.3 applies to ASEAN+1 FTAs’ 
three-phase approach, under which “the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that” it is “compatible with” 
the subsequent treaty.242  Nevertheless, a lex specialis argument may exclude the application of Article 30.3 
because the FTAs’ three-phase provisions can be interpreted as a special law that prevails over the general 
VCLT rule.243  Even if the argument fails, applying the later-in-time rule under Article 30.3 would encounter 
obstacles akin to those raised under the “more favorable” provisions because of the “compatibility” 
assessment in multi-issue claims.   
Finally, modern FTAs that incorporate investment chapters may conflict with coexistent BITs in 
investment-related disputes.  In the overlapping FTA-BIT context, the application of the VCLT involves 
different jurisdictional disputes.  ISDS mechanisms in FTAs and BITs with inconsistent scopes and carve-
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outs make the operation of Article 30.3 difficult.244  Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar, which concerned 1987 and 
1998 intra-ASEAN investment agreements, exemplified ASEAN jurisprudence on successive treaties.245  In 
the Tribunal’s view, the two agreements in dispute had different scopes of investment and ASEAN states 
had no intention to merge them.246  Article 12 of the 1998 agreement stipulates that it “shall prevail” if it 
“provides for better and enhanced provisions.”247  According to “the general practice of ASEAN with 
respect to successive agreements,” the Tribunal held that Article 12 should not be interpreted to amend the 
1987 agreement because the two pacts “are clearly intended to operate separately.”248  This decision similarly 
buttresses the difficulty in applying Article 30.3 of the VCLT in practice. 
RCEP negotiators should be aware that similar to FTA-FTA scenarios, de jure consolidation that solves 
FTA-BIT conflict is scarcely used.  Article 9.10 of the EU-Singapore FTA, which will terminate 12 BITs 
between EU states and Singapore, illustrates this approach.249  The China-Singapore FTA (CSFTA) utilizes 
a different type of de jure consolidation, which incorporates a wider-FTA’s investment obligations. 250  
Without its own investment provisions, the CSFTA makes the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement under 
the ASEAN-China FTA “an integral part of” the CSFTA.251   
Because only the Investment Agreement provides the ISDS mechanism, no jurisdiction conflict exists 
in relation to the CSFTA.  Yet, legal issues may relate to the China-Singapore BIT, which continues to be 
effective parallel with the CSFTA.  The 1985 BIT limits ISDS to “the amount of compensation” and 
confines the forum to “arbitral tribunals established by both parties.”252  A party may well resort to the 
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CSFTA for additional procedural guarantees.  In this regard, more detailed provisions under the CSFTA 
facilitate de facto FTA-BIT consolidation.  This approach could enable the RCEP to minimize normative 
conflicts of trade fragmentation. 
B. The RCEP as the Pathway to the FTAAP 
The unsettled path of the TPP and the TTIP amid populist isolationism made the RCEP’s status unique.  
Reinforcing the NREO argument requires an understanding of the RCEP as the pathway to the AEPC-
envisioned FTAAP in Third Regionalism.  This analysis not only fills the much-needed gap in the existing 
literature, but also benefits the revitalization of the Doha Round.  Currently, APEC includes 12 parties to 
the RCEP, which facilitates APEC’s Bogor Goals to accomplish Asia-Pacific trade and investment 
liberalization by 2020.253  APEC’s nature as a soft-law institution is distinct from FTAs that impose hard-
law obligations.  To minimize the “sovereign costs,” APEC’s operating basis neither involves the treaty-
ratification process nor incurs trade retaliation due to a violation of the pacta sunt servanda rule.254  The 
voluntary foundation helped bypass trade politics of regionalism, but resulted in APEC’s institutional 
weaknesses that marginalized its role.   
In 2004, the APEC Business Advisory Council propounded the 21-party FTAAP in order to 
reinvigorate APEC in light of proliferating FTAs.255  After APEC adopted the FTAAP vision in 2006, the 
2010 APEC Leaders’ Declaration identified “ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership” 
as pathways to the comprehensive trade pact. 256   Optimism about the TPP echoed the Obama 
administration’s engagement in P-4 agreement-based TPP negotiations in late 2009. 257   Notably, the 
“ASEAN plus” frameworks that “codified” China and Japan’s EAFTA and CEPEA proposals were distinct 
from the RCEP, which underpins ASEAN centrality. 
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To enrich the existing literature that only focuses on the TPP-FTAAP nexus, I offer an analysis on the 
RCEP as a more feasible pathway to the FTAAP.  The RCEP first appeared in the Annex on the 2014 
Beijing Roadmap, in which APEC declared that “the possible pathways to the FTAAP” encompass the TPP 
and the RCEP.258  The US-China rivalry led to the delicate language.  Beijing argued vigorously for the 
FTAAP when it hosted the APEC meetings.259  Washington opposed the proposal due to the concern about 
detracting the TPP and impairing the “pivot to Asia” strategy.260  The compromise was to pursue APEC’s 
two-year Collective Strategic Study to revitalize the FTAAP under the auspices of China.261  Markedly, 
APEC urged “the early completion of” RCEP negotiations in 2015.262  In the following year, APEC leaders 
endorsed the FTAAP Study that stresses the RCEP’s substantial impact on “the economic landscape of the 
region and the global economy.”263  Thus, APEC has placed the RCEP on par with the TPP as the integral 
part of the FTAAP roadmap, which could rejuvenate the stalled Doha Round negotiations. 
The US withdrawal from the TPP diverted the status of the TPP vis-à-vis the RCEP.  Article 30.5 of 
the TPP conditions its entry into force on the approval of countries that account for 85% of the combined 
GDP “of the original signatories,” thus making US membership indispensable. 264  The revision to this 
provision is a procedural hurdle for the remaining 11 TPP countries to overcome under the CPTPP.  
Substantively, it is contentious whether countries could retain the scope of concessions without having 
market access to the United States.  For instance, the CPTPP’s list of suspended provisions evidence 
Canada’s cultural exception request and Vietnam’s concerns about its IP and labor rights commitments.265  
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With Australia’s and Mexico’s support, Japan became the driving force for the CPTPP.266  Nonetheless, the 
fact that only Japan and New Zealand ratified the TPP and the remaining items to be finalized under the 
CPTPP may still cast doubt on the eventual entry into force of the agreement.267 
While the evolution of the TPP illustrates the structural North-South divide, the relative development 
of the RCEP strengthens the theoretical and substantive arguments for the NREO in Third Regionalism.  
From the new dependency theory perspective, the RCEP reaffirms the assertive legalism of developing 
nations by enabling new generation South-South FTAs to alter the subordinate relationship with the North.  
The realpolitik of international economic law elevated the RCEP from being considered a Plan B for global 
regionalism to the only “on track” mega-regional agreement that could considerably impact the multilateral 
trading system.   
Markedly, the accession to the TPP is restricted to “any State or separate customs territory,” which is 
an APEC member “as the Parties may agree.”268  In comparison, the RCEP’s open accession clause, which 
allows “any ASEAN FTA partner” or “any other external economic partners,” could result in a greater 
impact beyond the FTAAP.269  Pursuant to the AEC Blueprint 2025, the new ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA 
constitutes a new ASEAN+1 FTA and will pave the way for the Special Administrative Region of China to 
join the RCEP.270   Furthermore, the 2016 ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Framework for Cooperation that 
expedites integration between the AEC and Latin America reinforces South-based cooperation.271  The 
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potential coverage of additional APEC and TPP members, such as Chile and Peru, can be the building block 
for the FTAAP and transform the RCEP as the new trans-Pacific architecture.272 
C. The Pro-Development Operative Mechanism 
The RCEP stands unique among mega-regionals because of its South-based origin and pro-
development policy.  A functional operative mechanism is essential to construct the RCEP as the normative 
foundation for the Global South.  In line with ASEAN’s commitments to the Doha Development Agenda 
and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the RCEP will incorporate “appropriate forms of flexibility, 
including” SDT provisions and “additional flexibility” accorded to LDCs.273  The flexible mechanism is at 
the core of the legal framework of South-South FTAs, but its opaque interpretations run the risk of 
nullifying the RCEP’s effectiveness.  The APEC principle of flexibility highlights the soft-law regime that 
empowers members to choose their liberalization timeframes and exclude sensitive sectors from 
liberalization. 274   The intertwined non-discrimination principle, commonly referred to as “open 
regionalism,” often incurs free-riding concern about extending liberalization to non-members.275 
The APEC practice should not be confused with ASEAN’s hard-law notion of flexibility, which the 
RCEP will follow.276  The “ASEAN Minus” formula that crystalized SDT provisions allows for flexible 
participation and avoids the lowest common denominator dilemma under conventional South-South 
FTAs.277  Subject to the Grand Bargain, ASEAN+1 FTAs include lengthier yet clearly stipulated liberation 
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timeframes for CLMV countries.278  Entry into force provisions of ASEAN+1 FTAs similarly adopted this 
formula.279 
The RCEP should further take into account ASEAN’s internal practice.  Article 21 of the ASEAN 
Charter codified the ASEAN Minus modality and confined it to “the implementation of economic 
commitments” that all ASEAN states decided by consensus. 280   As the AEC’s services liberalization 
evidences, two or more members could liberalize selected sectors and permit the subsequent participation 
of other nations.281  Unlike APEC, the concessions are only conferred on a reciprocal basis in order to 
eliminate the free rider problem.  Arguably, the ASEAN Minus X formula could result in fragmented 
commitments at divergent speeds.  A legal loophole may exist when a state first agrees to its commitments, 
but then decides to opt out of such commitments after finding the implementation difficult.282  Therefore, 
the RCEP’s elaboration of ASEAN’s flexibility rules will not only benefit the AEC, but also serves as a pro-
development model for the South-based FTAs. 
For the sustainability of the mega-regional pact, I propose that the ASEAN Secretariat provide 
institutional support for the RCEP.283  The administrative design is often the last consideration of trade 
negotiators, but is critical to the FTA’s enforcement, monitoring and dispute settlement proceedings.  The 
TPP provisions to create the Committee on Development or the TPP Commission failed to consider the 
                                                 
278 For instance, the ASEAN-Korea FTA’s tariff liberalization timeframes include three categories: Korea and ASEAN 
six counties; Korea and Vietnam; and Korea and Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.  Annex 1, Agreement on Trade in 
Goods Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Among the Government of the 
Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea (2006).  For services and 
investment negotiations, see ASEAN-China Framework Agreement (2004), art. 8.3; Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (2009), at 8.3.  
279 For example, “Australia, New Zealand and at least four ASEAN Member States” could enable the AANZFTA to 
enter into force.  AANZFTA, ch. 18, art. 7.2.  In this regard, the ASEAN-China is the only exception to the ASEAN 
Minus X rule.  PETER JAN KUIJPER ET. AL., FROM TREATY-MAKING TO TREATY-BREAKING: MODELS FOR ASEAN 
EXTERNAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 97-98 (2015). 
280 ASEAN Charter (2007), art. 21.2.  The “ASEAN-X” modality, which is different from “Two Plus X,” can be traced 
back to the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation (1992).  SEVERINO, supra note 47, 
at 352-53; WOON, supra note 58, 158-59.  See also Chan Sze Wei, Decision-Making in the ASEAN Charter Process, in 50 
YEARS OF ASEAN AND SINGAPORE 235, 244 (Tommy Koh et. al. eds. 2017) (“AMM instructed HLTF that ASEAN-
X should be limited to the implementation of economic agreements.”).   
281 Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (2003), Article IV bis (ASEAN 
Minus X modality) was added to the AFAS.   
282 SEVERINO, supra note 47, at 352-53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 53, at 59. 
283 Under the $20 million budget, the ASEAN Secretariat currently has 300 staff members recruited from Indonesia 
and other ASEAN states.  Termsak Chalermpalanupap, No Brexit Repeat in ASEAN, DIPLOMAT, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/no-brexit-repeat-in-asean/. 




practical significance of an impartial, permanent secretariat.284  It may be suggested that as the RCEP 
functions as the pathway to the FTAAP, the institutional mechanism should be based on the APEC 
Secretariat.  This position does not stand.  Contrary to APEC’s assertion to be “an incubator of issues 
related to the FTAAP by providing leadership,” APEC’s role is limited to facilitating RCEP or TPP 
discussions on the sidelines of APEC meetings.285  The FTAAP will only “be realized outside of APEC” 
because APEC’s soft-law mechanism remains unaffected.286  In addition, the absence of treaty-based legal 
personality resulted in APEC’s sui generis status.  As only Singapore law conferred the 60-staff APEC 
Secretariat “the legal capacities of a body corporate,” privileges and immunities cannot be asserted in foreign 
proceedings.287   
Distinctively, the legal standing of ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter is reinforced by the conclusion 
of the ten-country agreement on privileges and immunities.288  The agreement, along with the detailed pact 
concluded between Indonesia and the ASEAN Secretariat, further extends functional benefits to “experts 
on missions for ASEAN” and “permanent missions” of foreign nations.289  The RCEP’s mutatis mutandis 
application in such rules could increase the structural efficiency of the mega-regional agreement.  Moreover, 
for development purposes, the institutional memory of the ASEAN Secretariat in enforcing the Initiative 
for ASEAN Integration (IAI) that assists CLMV countries is indispensable.290  The RCEP could consolidate 
the funding basis and enhance the capacity-building of the Secretariat.  The streamlining of the IAI with 
parallel ASEAN+6 technical assistance projects will collectively narrow the development gap and augment 
the pro-development effect for the Global South. 
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Emerging populist isolationism has diverted the path of the neoliberal international economic order 
and cast doubt on the TPP and other trade agreements.  By assessing the RCEP’s evolution as Asia’s new 
trade architecture, this article provided the most up-to-date examination of the implications of the 16-
country mega-FTA for Asian regionalism and the Doha Round.  By making interrelated theoretical and 
substantive claims, the article moved the conventional FTA discourse to a new dimension on the assertive 
legalism of developing nations.  It responded to the inquiry of the emerging NREO based on new-
generation South-South FTAs in the post-TPP era. 
The article argued that the RCEP will galvanize the paradigm change in Third Regionalism and provide 
a normative foundation for the Global South in international economic law.  Achieving de jure and de facto 
integration mandates that the RCEP commitments exceed not only ASEAN+1 FTAs, but also the AEC 
under the AEC Blueprint 2025.  To reinforce the new dependency theory, this research explored RCEP 
negotiations vis-à-vis the legal and policy strategies of ASEAN, China and India.  Based on ASEAN practice, 
it reveals multifaceted challenges to tariff eliminations, the noodle bowl syndrome, and the liberalization of 
services, such as professional mobility.  The contentious ISDS cases involving ASEAN states and the EU’s 
Asian FTAs were also critically evaluated. 
From a global perspective, the article explained the RCEP’s systemic impact on world trade law.  Under 
the WTO and VCLT jurisprudence, it analyzed the new dynamics of trade fragmentation owing to FTA and 
BIT jurisdictional conflicts that involve FTAs and BITs.  Constructing the RCEP as the pathway to the 
APEC-based FTAAP is imperative to reinvigorate the Doha Round.  The pro-development principle of 
flexibility and the institutional mechanism further buttress the RCEP’s indispensable position in Asian 
regionalism and the multilateral trading system. 
 
 
